Logical Truth and Historicity

The main goal of this project is to deal with the relationship between formal logic and historicity from a phenomenological viewpoint. This nexus deserves philosophical attention because the historical transformations affecting logic’s basic concepts seem to challenge the standard objectivistic interpretation of formal sciences. That is, any substantial change puts into question the assumed objectivity of these sciences and the transparency of their truths to human reason. How can the objectivity of logical thinking be reconciled with the historicity characterizing formal logic? The standard answer to such a question involves the elimination of the potentially disruptive effect of historical transformations through a linear, cumulative conception of scientific development. 

The basic hypothesis of this project is that the phenomenological conceptuality has the theoretical resources to reconceptualize this question, criticize the standard response, and propose a non-skeptical alternative. This shall be done in three steps. First, I will develop the relevant concepts of Husserl’s method of genetic phenomenology and justify its application to formal logic. Second, I will apply this method to a decisive historical case for the constitution of modern logic, namely Frege’s theory of concepts. Third, I will conclude that, although the historicity of a formal science like logic cannot be denied, it does not represent a threat to its objectivity. 

The specific method I shall employ is inspired by Husserl’s “genetic phenomenology”. Yet, I do not conceive it as a ready-made set of rules and concepts that can be indifferently applied to different domains. Rather, I mean to rely on Husserl’s texts devoted to the topic, the recent growing literature in the phenomenology of formal sciences, and some relevant findings in analytic philosophy to provide an original view that integrates these various contributions into a unified perspective. Although this investigation is grounded in my previous research, this project represents the next crucial step in my research career. This is the case because it brings together the various competencies that I have developed so far (historical, logical, phenomenological) to elaborate an independent view about pressing questions at the intersection between the philosophy of logic and epistemology. Accordingly, the innovative ideas of the project with respect to the state of the art concern both the general outlook and the specific steps. In general, my project wants to handle a crucial epistemological question with the often neglected conceptual resources of the phenomenological tradition.