Wider research context: Puzzlingly, we sometimes act against our better judgment, freely and intentionally doing things we know are bad for us, or worse than the available alternatives. Everyday examples abound and vary in nature and severity: ignoring our common sense all too easily, hastily abandoning firm resolutions, procrastinating endlessly, or repeatedly engaging in self-destructive behavior are all instances of what philosophers have referred to as akratic or weak-willed actions (sometimes rigorously distinguishing between them). These actions flout deeply entrenched intuitions about how and why we act, seemingly eroding the normative power and scope of good reasons, judgments, and intentions in our practical, or indeed moral, deliberations. But how is this possible, and is there anything we can do about it? This complex and important problem is located at the crossroads between philosophy of action, rational choice theory, psychopathology, and moral psychology, and has attracted significant scholarly attention from these and related fields.

This research project aims to contribute to the philosophical understanding of this issue by offering the first systematic phenomenological analysis of the structure and mechanisms of akratic and weak-willed agency. Hypothesis: The hypothesis of this research project is that our overall understanding of weakness of will and akrasia would be significantly enhanced by a phenomenological account of the agent manifesting them. We will be arguing – contrary to the current scholarship’s disproportionate interest in isolated akratic and weak-willed actions – that these phenomena can only be properly situated and understood within the broader context of a holistically articulated sense of a person’s agency, and that phenomenology is uniquely well-suited to provide this account. Approach and methods: We will utilize the methodological and conceptual apparatus of phenomenology in our analysis, as well as harness the rich phenomenological studies – both classical and contemporary – of the relevant aspects of experience and agency, such as the structure of volition, habitualization, the sense of corporeal and intellectual possibility, and temporality in action. Level of innovation: This research project is innovative in two important respects: 1.) Contrary to the existing scholarship, we explicitly argue for the central importance of a holistic account of the akratic or weak-willed agent. This account, we contend, can be elaborated via several concepts typically underutilized in philosophy of action, such as character, habits, and sense of possibility. 2.) We develop and support our argument with the range of methods and concepts specific to the phenomenological philosophical tradition. Despite its wealth of fruitful insights and apt, illuminating methods, the latter has been largely ignored in contemporary philosophy of action. This project aims to rectify that.